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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to examine how governance mechanisms impact on supplier delivery 
performance intermediated by buyer-supplier trust and supplier opportunism. The study focuses on Uganda’s 
public sector as a case of a less developed country. The research was prompted by frequent reports which 
indicate that outsourcing contracts fail to deliver on schedule, budget, specifications, and quality and do not 
deliver expected value to the public. This could be attributed to poor governance mechanisms, lack of buyer-
supplier trust and high levels of supplier opportunism. While it has been assumed that governance mechanisms 
result in better supplier delivery performance, empirical research to corroborate these claims in less developed 
countries context is very sparse. A theoretical model and hypotheses are developed from literature review.  A 
cross sectional data set collected from 632 Uganda’s public sector staff is used to validate the model. 
Hierarchical regression results reveal that governance mechanisms are significant predictors of supplier delivery 
performance. The results also suggest that the impact of governance mechanisms on supplier delivery 
performance is intermediated by buyer-supplier trust and supplier opportunism. Managers of public sector need 
to design well outsourced contracts and create mutual trust with their suppliers to improve supplier delivery 
performance. Similarly, there is a need to deliberately mitigate supplier opportunism that appears to significantly 
diminish supplier delivery performance. 
Keywords Outsourcing contracts, governance mechanisms, buyer-supplier trust, supplier opportunism, public 
sector, supplier delivery performance 
Paper type Research paper 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Public sector procurement often makes up 10-20% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of developed countries 
(OECD, 2013) and accounts for up to 30-36% of most developing nation’s GDP in Sub Saharan Africa 
(Commonwealth secretariat, 2013). For instance, Uganda’s 2012/13 budget indicates that on average 65% of the 
central government’s recurrent non-wage is expended on public procurement related items. Given this scale of 
government spending, public procurement is potentially a useful policy tool for growth and the socio-economic 
transformation of any country (WTO, 2013).  
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets (PPDA) Act (2003), the law that regulates procurement in 
Uganda describes public procurement as the acquisition of goods, services, and works by government using 
public funds.  Uganda’s public sector entities such as ministries, districts, state commissions, and parastatals 
have massively adopted outsourcing to reduce costs, increase flexibility, access better expertise, improve quality 
of services, reduce capital investment and improve internal user satisfaction (Public Procurement and Disposal of 
Assets (PPDA) Authority, 2011). These entities outsource non-core functions like fleet management, information 
technology, consultancy, cleaning services, security, waste management, couriers’ services, catering services, 
training, renovations etc. to improve supplier delivery performance. However, supplier delivery performance has 
not improved in Uganda’s public sector to date (PPDA Authority, 2011; National Integrity Survey-NIS, 2008; 
Office of the Inspectorate of Government-IGG, 2010).  
Evidence suggests that Uganda’s public entities are suffering from long lead times (NIS, 2008), poor 
quality of services delivered (PPDA Authority, 2008; 2009), and high levels of contract violations and cheating 
(IGG, 2009; 2010). Simply, outsourced services are not delivered on time, specifications are not being met as 
required (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting-CHOGM) report, 2010), and internal users complain 
of late deliveries (Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC), 2010).  
The accounting officers, contract committees and procurement officers often sign contracts on behalf of 
government with suppliers which are drafted by government legal departments to safeguard the outsourcing 
processes. Despite the existence of governance mechanisms, most suppliers have persistently failed to fulfill 
contract terms that they signed (PPDA Authority, 2012). 
PPDA Authority (2012), the body that regulates procurement in Uganda reported that more than $200 
million is lost every year due to suppliers’ failure to deliver as per terms of the signed outsourcing contracts. 
These figures are only based on procurement related cases that have been reported to police as well as the 
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estimated amounts that have been unearthed during the recent public procurement audits. Despite all these 
alarming evidences little has been done to address such problems in any meaningful way.  
Firms often use governance mechanisms to structure their relationships in order to mitigate risks arising 
from contractual relationships (Williamson, 1979). However, the specification, drafting and implementation of 
governance mechanisms in Uganda are difficult due to the widespread supplier opportunism which has adversely 
affected contract negotiation, signing and contract management (Ntayi, Namugenyi and Eyaa, 2010a). The 
PPDA Annual Audit Reports from Uganda reveal that since the introduction of the Public Procurement and 
Disposal of Assets (PPDA) Act in 2003, public sector still lacks proper governance mechanisms to reduce 
supplier opportunism and the related transaction costs (PPDA Authority, 2011; 2012). This practice greatly 
undermines the preparation of contract implementation plans for monitoring purposes (Ntayi, et al., 2010a). 
PPDA Authority (2012) audit report further identified lack of contract monitoring plans as a major 
cause of failure for contractual partners to detect and rectify deviations from the initial specifications on time. 
Additionally, Uganda’s public sector lacks complete information about the progress of the procurement process, 
status of implementation of the procurement contracts, the number of procurement contracts awarded to service 
providers and the performance levels of service providers who have been awarded contracts in the past (Ntayi, et 
al., 2010a). The PPDA Authority (2012) Audit Report also confirmed that most of the contracts under 
implementation in the public sector are not on file. This hinders development of best practices in contract design, 
complicates the implementation, monitoring and assessment of contracts and promotes supplier opportunism and 
loss of money (Ntayi, et al., 2010a).  
Most of Uganda’s public sector suppliers tend to think less about client satisfaction and more about how 
to win the next contracts, make more money and survive in the market using kickbacks (Ntayi, et al., 2010b). 
This state of affairs could possibly be responsible for buyer-supplier mistrust, making clients view outsourcing 
contracts as unpredictable in terms of utility, quality, cost effectiveness and timely delivery (Ntayi, 2010b). 
Thus, to reduce performance ambiguity and ensure supplier delivery performance, there is a clear need for 
adequate quantitative information on contract governance in Uganda. What exists currently is fragmentary and 
disconnected, which needs to be corroborated with a scientific study. 
Some previous research has examined the performance of suppliers for outsourcing contracts 
(Anderson, 1988; Wathne and Heide, 2000; Gottschalk and Solli-Saether, 2005; Goo et al., 2009; Stefanie et al., 
2010). A common finding appears to suggest that failure to perform may be a consequence of opportunistic 
tendencies which characterise business contracts in social exchanges and principle agent relationships.  Poppo 
and Zenger (2002) indicate that every contract has the purpose of facilitating exchange and preventing 
opportunistic behaviour. Supplier opportunism is “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1979). Ntayi et 
al. (2010b) describe guile as “lying, stealing, cheating and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate or otherwise confuse.”  
According to Wathne and Heide (2000), elusive behaviors such as dishonoring contracts, careless work, 
shirking and failure to fulfill promises are common characteristics of supplier opportunism. Thus, the lack of 
well specified contracts coupled with unreliable contract design procedures, inadequate contractual enforcement 
and monitoring mechanisms could possibly explain the current increased supplier opportunism, lack of buyer-
supplier trust and poor supplier delivery performance (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Some scholars have conducted research on public procurement in Uganda, for instance, Ntayi et al. 
(2010c) examined procurement officers’ deviant behaviour focusing on moral disengagement, work anomie, 
perceived normative conflict, and procurement planning behaviour as predictor variables. Ntayi et al. (2010b) 
explicated how perceived project value, opportunistic behaviour, and inter-organizational cooperation affect 
contractor performance. Basheka (2009) elucidated public procurement corruption and its implications on 
service delivery. NIS (2006 and 2008) research sought to identify the most corrupt entities in both central and 
local government domains. Ahimbisibwe and Muhwezi (2012) studied the effects of vertical collaborations and 
buyer-supplier compliance on contract performance in Uganda’s Public Procuring and Disposing Entities 
(PDEs). Ntayi et al. (2010d) investigated the association of social cohesion, groupthink and ethical behaviour of 
public procurement officers. However, none of these studies examine the impact of governance mechanisms on 
supplier delivery performance intermediated by trust and supplier opportunism for outsourcing which has 
recently gained a lot of momentum in Uganda. This study aims at filling this gap.  
While research concerning outsourcing by organizations located in what may be referred to as more 
developed economies apparently continues to grow and mature, most of the existing literature involving less 
developed countries and outsourcing is relatively young, speculative and anecdotal, and still lacks sound 
theoretical explanations. The paucity of empirical research coupled with the absence of comparative studies 
make understanding the basis for the aforementioned problems difficult in less developed countries. 
Consequently outsourcing in less developed countries like Uganda is clearly understudied and not well 
understood. 
 The purpose of this study is to investigate how governance mechanisms impact supplier delivery 
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performance intermediated by buyer-supplier trust and supplier opportunism in Uganda’s public procurement 
and to draw implications for least developed countries. In doing so, this research makes a contribution to an area 
of study clearly in need of additional research. The rest of this article is organised as follows: The next section 
reviews literature, develops hypotheses and proposes the theoretical model.  The subsequent two sections present 
methodology and data analysis results. Finally, the article concludes by discussing the findings, implications, 
limitations and directions for future research.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1. Governance mechanisms and buyer-supplier trust 
According to Goo et al., (2009), contracts provide the framework for the economic exchange, outlining the 
nature and terms of the relationship, what is to be provided and the rights and obligations of parties. Goo et al. 
(2009) further indicate that outsourced contracts mainly involve Service Level Agreements (SLA). Service Level 
Agreements are essentially formal written agreements developed jointly between service recipient and service 
provider that specifies a product or service to be provided at a certain level so as to meet business objectives 
(Goo et al., 2009, p.122). SLA is intended to specify responsibilities, strengthen communication, reduce conflict, 
mitigate supplier opportunism and build trust in an exchange relationship over time (Brown et al., 2003).  
According to Goo et al. (2009), a SLA usually reflects three elements as foundation, change management and 
governance. 
The foundation characteristics in SLAs collectively explain the common beliefs between organizations, 
which intend to build a spirit of agreement among those entities involved with its development. Elements under 
foundation characteristics include service level objectives, process ownership plan, pricing schedules and service 
level contents. The change characteristics address the issues of how various situations that may occur during the 
course of the contract would be handled like price inflation clauses in the industrial purchasing contracts and 
express warranties that address product failure. Governance characteristics provide administrative procedures for 
implementing the party’s roles and obligations in a contract. They explain ways of how to manage the 
relationship through a clear statement of the measurements, conflict arbitration, penalty, rewards and an agreed 
upon means to facilitate communication.  
Buyer-supplier trust is the firm’s belief that another party will perform actions that will result in 
positive outcomes for the firm as well as not take unexpected actions that will result in negative outcomes 
(Stefanie et al., 2010). Trust is therefore reflected by confidence, predictability, credibility, ability, competence, 
expertness, consistence and friendliness (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  
Well-specified formal contracts can help to build buyer-supplier trust by enabling open communication, 
joint problem solving and mutual support between parties (Goo et al., 2009; Ntayi, 2010a). Clearly articulated 
contractual terms as well as relational norms of flexibility, solidarity, bilateralism and continuance may inspire 
confidence to cooperate in inter-organizational trust (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Well-crafted contracts promote 
longevity in exchanges by increasing the penalties that accompany severing an exchange relationship. Contracts 
also provide customized approaches and mutually agreed upon policies and procedures for dealing with 
necessary adaptations in an exchange. 
However, the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and buyer-supplier may also 
function in reverse (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The continuity and cooperation encouraged by relational 
governance in form of buyer-supplier trust may generate contractual refinements that further support greater 
cooperation while buyer-supplier trust may also intensify the probability that trust and cooperation will 
safeguard against hazards poorly protected by the contract. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that: H1: There is a 
significant positive relationship between well designed governance mechanisms and buyer-supplier trust. 
2.2.2. Buyer-Supplier Trust and Supplier delivery Performance  
According to Ntayi et al. (2010a), supplier delivery performance involves on-time and budget/cost delivery, 
delivery reliability, order completeness, delivery speed, quality of goods provided by the supplier, frequency of 
delivery, number of faulty deliveries, and conditions under which supplies are received. While some research 
tends to focus only on governance efficiency in examining buyer-supplier exchange performance, to fully 
understand the overall satisfaction for the exchange performance there is a need to include effectiveness too. 
Simply, supplier delivery performance should be assessed based on the level of overall buyer’s satisfaction with 
the buyer-supplier exchange. For instance, this line of thinking seems to resonate well with Poppo and Zenger’s 
(2002) conceptualization that focused on the overall cost of the service, the quality of the services and the 
vendors’ responsiveness to problems or inquiries (p.715).  
Buyer-supplier trust has multiple impacts on supplier performance transactions between organizations 
(Koh et al., 2009). It reduces transaction costs (Chiles and McMackin, 1996), improves governance choices and 
exchange performance (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Buyre-supplier trust creates cooperation and commitment, 
enables firms to accumulate strategic resources that are rare, valuable, and rare to mimic with no readily 
substitutes (Hoyt and Huq, 2000). It also enhances information sharing (Dyer and Chu, 2003), and reduces 
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negotiations and conflicts (Zaheer et al., 1998a; Johnston et al., 2004) between organizations. All these 
aforementioned outcomes directly translate to better supplier delivery performance. Accordingly, it can be 
hypothesized that: H2: There is a positive relationship between buyer–supplier trust and supplier delivery 
performance at the organizational level. 
2.2.3. Contractual governance mechanisms and supplier opportunism 
Supplier opportunism is seeking gain for oneself at the expense of others and such behaviour is usually 
associated with breaches of contract (Stefanie et al., 2010). Supplier opportunism takes various forms, depending 
on the mechanism used for the governance of contractual business activities. Wathne and Heide (2000) offered a 
framework of four forms of supplier opportunism, namely; evasion, refusal to adapt, violation of contract, and 
forced renegotiation. Their study generally revealed that suppliers tended to hold more key information with 
respect to their own products, including the products’ function, quality, and cost.  
When buyers do not completely understand the particular attributes of a given product or service, 
sometimes suppliers will adopt opportunistic behaviours in order to pursue their own latent interests. Anderson 
(1988) found that transaction costs arise from incomplete contracting and are determinants of supplier 
opportunism.  It may seem natural that humans act to further their own self-interests (Ang and Straub, (1998). 
Supplier opportunism arises because buyers have imperfect control over their suppliers, suppliers have personal 
interests and buyer-supplier contracts are vague and incomplete. Supplier opportunism increases with 
unpredictability of the environment which can be minimised through formal contracts.  
Williamson (1979) indicates that firms are capable of depressing opportunism by using the legitimate 
authority through contracting to monitor and conduct audits of supplier activities. When the performance criteria 
are lacking or ambiguous or its assessment is problematic then opportunism is difficult to control. Opportunism 
increases as performance becomes more difficult to evaluate by indicators of both short and long term (Artz and 
Brush, 2000). Based upon the aforementioned discussion, it can be hypothesized that: H3: There is a significant 
negative relationship between well designed governance mechanisms and supplier opportunism. 
2.2.4. Supplier opportunism and supplier delivery performance  
Supplier opportunism is generally characterized by calculated efforts to mislead, disagree, confuse, withhold or 
distort information, avoid or fail to fulfil promises or obligations, and appropriate a firm’s technology when 
possible. As a result, such behaviour have negative implications for supplier performance (Wathne and Heide, 
2000). Poor supplier performance is exemplified by late delivery, delivery unreliability, order incompleteness, 
poor delivery speed, poor quality of goods or services provided, infrequency of delivery, faulty deliveries, high 
prices, failure to match specifications, and unfair conditions under which goods and or services are delivered 
(Ntayi et al., 2010c), and is seen as a major source of increased costs.  
Individuals within organizations who perceive the threat of supplier opportunism are faced with a 
greater need for screening, negotiating, and monitoring partners’ behavior, which results in increased transaction 
costs. In addition, supplier opportunism can also negatively affect an organizations performance resulting from a 
supplier’s lack of commitment to, or execution of, a given contract’s terms, and consequently, the value 
contributed by the supplier to the buyer’s respective organization or group (Ntayi et al., 2010b). Perceived 
potential for supplier opportunism poses the most critical threat to satisfactory cooperation (Ang and Straub, 
1998), and at the same time is instrumental in causing contracts dissolution (Anderson, 1988). Consistent with 
the above discussion it can be hypothesized that: H4: There is a negative relationship between supplier 
opportunism and supplier delivery performance. 
Connecting H1 and H2 in the theoretical model, there shows a need to investigate the mediating role of 
the buyer-supplier trust existing between governance mechanism and supplier delivery performance, whereas, 
connecting H3 and H4, there shows a need to investigate the mediating role of the supplier opportunism that may 
exist between governance mechanism and supplier delivery performance. However, whether these mediating 
roles are full or partial deserves further attention. In the present study, one of the objectives is to explore the 
mediating role of buyer-supplier trust and supplier opportunism between the governance mechanism and supplier 
delivery performance. It can therefore be predicted that supplier delivery performance is largely influenced by 
buyer-supplier-trust and supplier opportunism, and these are influenced by governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
it can be proposed that: 
H5: Buyer-supplier-trust significantly mediates the relationship between governance  
mechanisms and supplier delivery performance.  
H6: Supplier opportunism significantly mediates the relationship between governance  
mechanisms and supplier delivery performance. 
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Figure 1 demonstrates the hypothesized relationships between governance mechanisms, buyer-supplier trust, 
supplier opportunism and supplier delivery performance. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical model 
 
2.3. Explanation of the theoretical model  
The theoretical model in Figure 1 shows the relationship between governance mechanisms, buyer-supplier trust, 
supplier opportunism, and supplier delivery performance. The design of the contractual terms of outsourced 
contracts and the means by which they are managed may influence the behaviours adopted by the parties 
involved in the form of trust or opportunistic behaviours between the suppliers and the public sector entities 
(buyer) which affects the supplier’s ultimate delivery performance. Accordingly, it can be expected that the 
influence of governance mechanisms on supplier delivery performance takes such a route: governance 
mechanisms influence buyer-supplier trust and supplier opportunism, and in turn, determine supplier delivery 
performance in the management of a particular outsourcing contract. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Research Design 
This research adopted a quantitative and cross sectional research design and used a self-administered survey to 
identify and draw inferences concerning the relationships between governance mechanisms, buyer-supplier trust, 
supplier opportunism and supplier delivery performance. Zero-order correlation and hierarchical regression 
analyses were conducted to investigate the relationships between the variables and the extent to which 
independent variables explained supplier delivery performance within Uganda’s public sector procurement. 
 
3.2. Survey design and Measurements  
The self-administered survey was initially designed based on findings from a comprehensive literature review 
involving governance mechanisms, buyer-supplier trust, supplier opportunism, and supplier delivery 
performance (Table I).  
Each construct as outlined in the conceptual model proposed by this study was measured by at least five 
questions or items that were created on the basis of established outsourcing theories. Survey questions were 
designed to capture perceptions that individuals from the Accounting Office (AO), Contract Committees and 
Procurement Office had about outsourcing contracts for which they are expected to manage on an on-going 
basis. Perceptual measures are frequently used in management research since they can parallel objective data in 
accuracy and research has supported the use of department managers as the key respondents for questions 
regarding performance within their respective departments and or organization (Kearns & Sabherwal, 2007). All 
the responses in the questionnaire were anchored on a 5-point Likert scale of strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), 
not sure (3), agree (4), and strongly agree (5).  
 
 
 H1+ 
 Notes:  
+= Hypothesized positive relationships 
- = Hypothesized negative relationships 
 H2+ 
 H4- 
 H3- 
Supplier 
Opportunism 
Supplier 
Delivery Performance 
Governance  
Mechanisms  
Buyer-Supplier      
Trust 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.24, 2015 
 
99 
Table I 
 Measures, sources and reliability 
Measures Source Cronbach 
alpha 
1. Governance mechanisms Goo et al. (2009) 
Stefanie et al. 
(2010) 
0.91 
Service level objectives   
We include a statement of our management and organizational structure at the end of 
outsourced contract once the relationship is fully operational. 
  
 We include statement of innovation expectations and capabilities of the service 
provider. 
  
We include a statement of our business objectives from the service.   
Process ownership plan   
Our outsourced contract contains statement of process ownership roles and 
responsibilities 
  
Our outsourced contract contains list of processes that are required to manage the 
agreements between us and service providers. 
  
Our outsourced contract contains list of processes directly affected by the services 
included in the agreements. 
  
Service level contents   
Our outsourced contract contains a statement of the key business measurements 
required. 
  
Outsourced contract contains established service quality targets   
Outsourced contract contains general description of the services required, major 
categories of the services, specific service elements. 
  
Measurement charter   
Our outsourced contract contains a statement of measurement methodology.   
Our outsourced contract contains definition of what is to be measured e.g. price, 
customer satisfaction. 
  
Outsourced contract contains definition of the processes to periodically measure the 
defined categories. 
  
Conflict arbitration charter   
Our outsourced contract contains a statement of the parameters for involving the third 
party in discussions between us and service providers. 
  
Outsourced contract contain a schedule for regular interaction and timetables for 
resolving issues between us and the providers. 
  
Outsourced contract contains a statement of the practices and conduct rules required to 
preserve the independence of the independent. 
  
Enforcement plan   
Our outsourced contract contains penalty definitions and formula   
Our outsourced contract contains conditions under which termination may occur.   
outsourced contract contains statement of exit responsibilities   
2. Buyer-supplier trust   Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) 
Stefanie et al. 
(2010) 
0.89 
Promises made by this supplier are reliable.    
This supplier is knowledgeable regarding his/her products.    
This supplier is open in dealing with us.   
If problems such as shipment delays arise, the supplier is honest about the problems.   
This supplier has no problems answering our questions.   
This supplier has made sacrifices for us in the past.    
This supplier cares for us.    
In times of shortages, this supplier has gone out on a extremity for us.    
This supplier is like a friend.    
We feel the supplier has been on our side.    
3. Supplier opportunism Wathne and 
Heide (2000) 
Ntayi et al. 
(2010b) 
0.86 
The supplier changes prices without our knowledge   
Our supplier does not give us truthful information   
Our supplier gives us wrong information about goods and services.   
The supplier does anything within his means to further his own interests.   
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Promises made by our supplier are not all fulfilled.   
Our supplier does not inform us when they are going to replace their suppliers.   
Our supplier evades the performance of some duties.   
Our supplier refuses to adopt our contract terms and conditions   
On occasion, the supplier has lied about certain things in order to protect his interest.   
Sometimes the supplier slightly alters facts in order to get what he /she wants.   
Sometimes the supplier presents facts in such way that he looks good.   
Our supplier drags us into forced negotiations.   
4. Public sector supplier performance Ntayi et al. 
(2010a) 
0.89 
Supplier delivery  is reliable   
Supplier delivers complete orders as required   
Supplier delivery speed is good   
Supplier delivers as per the specifications.   
We do not doubt the quality of outsourced services   
The outsourced services are free from defects   
Supplier has been consistent   
Supplier delivers as many times as required    
Supplier makes fine deliveries without faults   
Supplier charges fair prices compared to others   
Supplier is flexible   
User complaints have reduced since we started using this supplier   
Our outsourced providers are cooperative in problem solving   
 
 
3.3. Sampling and validation of research instruments 
Simple random sampling method was used to select entities for the pilot study where all the 141 central 
government entities were written down on small pieces of paper and mixed in a box; then 48 of them were 
randomly picked in accordance with Krejcie and Morgan (1970). This method of sampling gave an equal chance 
to each public sector entity in the sampling frame that was chosen for pilot testing.  
The initial draft of the survey was then pilot tested using management professors from Makerere 
University Kampala, a major research university in Uganda, as respondents. Next, the pilot survey was tested 
using individuals from the selected 48 public sector entities as respondents and yielded 95% response rate.  
Based on these pilot tests and comments from respondents concerning the clarity of the questions contained 
within the survey, measurement items were improved as required and any changes were consistent with the 
guidelines set forth by Dillman (1991); questions were brief and to the point, addressing only a single issue at a 
time.  
 
3.4. Data collection  
Data were collected from all central government entities for outsourcing contracts in Uganda. Prior to data 
collection, public entities were contacted individually and asked to confirm if they had been involved in 
managing any outsourcing contracts, most entities confirmed that they had been involved in outsourcing 
contracts and they confirmed that they could provide some relevant data in this regard.  For each entity, the 
chairman Contracts Committee (CC), head of Procurement and Disposal Unit (PDU) and at least 3 users were 
considered for participation in this study. These individuals were considered to be more knowledgeable about the 
subject matter of this study because of their participation in drafting, monitoring, terminating, etc., of 
outsourcing contracts.  Of the 715 copies of the questionnaires that were initially sent out, 632 usable 
questionnaires representing 88.3% response rate were returned and analyzed using SPSS version 19.0.  
The high response rate was probably attributed to the researcher’s professional networks, teaching 
public procurement in a postgraduate school of a major public university and involvement in consultancy in a 
public procurement in Uganda, SADC, COMESA and with the World Bank. All the data was collected from all 
central government entities which have offices in Kampala (capital city). All the questionnaires were hand 
delivered and picked back from the respective offices of the respondents involved in the study.  This is slightly 
different from the developed world where most surveys are web-based because the research setting and context 
differ. There are still challenges with connectivity and low usage of internet in Uganda and web based surveys 
are not usually successful and give poor response rates. 
 
3.5. Sample characteristics 
The results indicate that the majority of the respondents were males (58.5%) while the females comprised 41.5% 
of the sample. Majority of both males (37.4%) and females (35.4%) ranged between 41 to 50 years of age, the 
least proportion of the respondents represented for both males (8.2%) and females (4.4%) were 61 years and 
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above. The majority of the respondents were team members (49.0%) while the heads of sections and the team 
leaders comprised of 24.8% and 26.1% respectively. 0.3% of the respondents had studied up to primary level, 
2.3% completed secondary schools while 97.4% had university level qualifications. Overall respondents from 
the parastatals dominated the sample (55.6%) followed by those from the ministries (25.5%), the commissions 
(17.0%) and the hospitals 2.0%. It was further observed that 85% of the entities surveyed had more than 1,000 
employees with parastatals (60.0%) and Ministries (24.0) dominating this workforce category. The descriptive 
statistics further revealed that the services that had been frequently outsourced included cleaning services 
(85.3%), consultancy (74.2%), security (70.9%), maintenance (70.3%), courier and messenger (44.8%) and fleet 
management (34.3%). Thus, all categories were well represented and hence the findings of this study can be used 
to draw conclusions that can be generalized.  
 
3.6. Data management and screening  
Data were checked for errors, outliers, missing values and any possible inconsistencies in responses given by the 
respondents, and cleaned prior to data analysis. Simple frequencies were run to identify missing values. The 
identified missing values were a result of omissions made by respondents, which constituted less than 1% of the 
data hence deemed trivial and inconsequential to suppress the standard deviations (Field, 2006). Missing data 
were completely at random (MCAR) since the missing values were a result of omissions not related to other 
values. Mean imputation replacement method was used to treat the missing data. 
Data screening assessed whether the assumptions of parametric data were acceptable. Specific 
assumptions tested and found acceptable included normality of the distribution of the data, homocedacity and 
linearity of the data independence of errors.  For multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were all  
less than 4 and tolerance ratios were  above 0.1, indicating that multicollinearity in this study was not a problem 
(Field, 2006). As such, the interpretations of the beta coefficients and R-square values were considered reliable.  
Following guidelines set forth by Podsakoff et al. (2003), Common method bias was addressed by 
avoiding vague concepts, kept questions simple, specific and concise, and avoided double barreled questions. 
Second, Harman’s one factor test was conducted. No single factor emerged or one general factor accounted for 
most of the variance implying that no substantial common method bias was present. On close examination of the 
output from the unrotated factor solution, discriminant validity was present.   
Non-response bias test for all mean differences for each of the constructs did not reveal any significant 
difference between the early and late questionnaires (2-tailed t-tests, p < 0.05).  
 
3.7. Factor Analysis 
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted using the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) approach with 
varimax rotation to establish the underlying pattern in the data. PCA approach was chosen because it provides a 
linear summarization of the data into simpler components and produces exact scores rather than estimates. PCA 
is also the simplest of the true eigenvector-based multivariate analyses that often reveals the internal structure of 
the data in a way that best explains the variance by providing the user with a lower-dimensional picture when 
viewed from its most informative viewpoint. Varimax rotation generally yields more stable results and is easier 
to interpret (Ahimbisibwe & Nangoli, 2012). A number of meaningful factors explaining a larger percentage of 
the common item variance emerged and all items loaded cleanly on the hypothesized constructs exceeding 0.50 
as illustrated in Tables II, III, IV and V. 
Factor analysis results for governance mechanisms yielded six components which were interpreted as 
service level objectives (variance= 11.46%), process ownership plan (variance= 11.32%), service level contents 
(variance 11.31%), measurement charter (variance 10.8), conflict arbitration charter (variance 10.6%), and 
enforcement charter (variance 10.1%) all explaining 65.59% of the total variance in governance mechanisms 
(Table II).  
 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.24, 2015 
 
102 
Table II 
 Factor analysis results: governance mechanisms 
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We include a statement of our management and 
organizational structure at the end of outsourced 
contract once the relationship is fully operational. 
.77      
 We include statement of innovation expectations and 
capabilities of the service provider. 
.69      
We include a statement of our business objectives from 
the service. 
.714      
Our outsourced contract contains statement of process 
ownership roles and responsibilities 
 .70     
Our outsourced contract contains list of processes that 
are required to manage the agreements between us and 
service providers. 
 .67     
Our outsourced contract contains list of processes 
directly affected by the services included in the 
agreements. 
 .63     
Our outsourced contract contains a statement of the key 
business measurements required. 
  .71    
Outsourced contract contains established service quality 
targets 
  .57    
Outsourced contract contains general description of the 
services required, major categories of the services, 
specific service elements. 
  .769    
Our outsourced contract contains a statement of 
measurement methodology. 
   .67   
Our outsourced contract contains definition of what is to 
be measured e.g. price, customer satisfaction. 
   .62   
Outsourced contract contains definition of the processes 
to periodically measure the defined categories. 
   .73   
Our outsourced contract contains a statement of the 
parameters for involving the third party in discussions 
between us and service providers. 
    .67  
Outsourced contract contain a schedule for regular 
interaction and timetables for resolving issues between 
us and the providers. 
    .71  
Outsourced contract contains a statement of the 
practices and conduct rules required to preserve the 
independence of the independent. 
    .69  
Our outsourced contract contains penalty definitions 
and formula 
     .72 
Our outsourced contract contains conditions under 
which termination may occur. 
     .65 
outsourced contract contains statement of exit 
responsibilities 
     .61 
Eigen Value 1.98 1.95 1.92 1.84 1.82 1.81 
Variance % 11.46 11.32 11.31 10.8 10.6 10.1 
Cumulative % 11.46 22.78 34.09 44.89 55.49 65.59 
Buyer-supplier trust yielded three components which were interpreted as honesty (variance= 19.36%), credibility 
(variance= 19.32%) and benevolence (variance= 19.31%). The trio together explained 57.99% of the variance in 
buyer-supplier trust (Table III).  
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Table III 
Factor analysis results: buyer-supplier trust 
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Promises made by this supplier are reliable.  .75   
This supplier is knowledgeable regarding his/her products.  .73   
This supplier is open in dealing with us. .77   
If problems such as shipment delays arise, the supplier is honest about the problems.  .72  
This supplier has no problems answering our questions.  .71  
This supplier has made sacrifices for us in the past.   .69  
This supplier cares for us.    .72 
In times of shortages, this supplier has gone out on a extremity for us.    .67 
This supplier is like a friend.    .69 
We feel the supplier has been on our side.    .58 
Eigen Value 2.97 2.94 2.91 
Variance % 19.36 19.32 19.31 
Cumulative % 19.39 38.68 57.99 
Supplier opportunism yielded three components which were interpreted as distorting information (variance= 
25.36%), shrinking promises (variance= 24.32%) and evasion (variance= 23.31%). The trio together explained 
72.99% of the variance in supplier opportunism (Table IV).  
 
Table IV 
Factor analysis results: supplier opportunism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ist
o
rt
in
g 
in
for
m
a
tio
n
 
Sh
rin
ki
n
g 
pr
o
m
ise
s 
Ev
a
sio
n
 
The supplier changes prices without our knowledge .76   
Our supplier does not give us truthful information .73   
Our supplier gives us wrong information about goods and services. .77   
The supplier does anything within his means to further his own interests. .75   
Promises made by our supplier are not all fulfilled.  .76  
Our supplier does not inform us when they are going to replace their suppliers.  .72  
Our supplier refuses to adopt our contract terms and conditions  .74  
On occasion, the supplier has lied about certain things in order to protect his 
interest. 
 .71  
Our supplier evades the performance of some duties.   .78 
Sometimes the supplier slightly alters facts in order to get what he /she wants.   .73 
Sometimes the supplier presents facts in such way that he looks good.   .69 
Our supplier drags us into forced negotiations.   .68 
Eigen Value 3.32 3.21 3.19 
Variance % 25.36 24.32 23.31 
Cumulative % 25.36 49.62 72.99 
Supplier delivery performance yielded three components with explained variance of 75.99% of the variance in 
supplier delivery performance. The three components were interpreted as supplier reliability (variance= 
26.36%), matching specifications (variance= 25.32%) and cost mitigation (variance= 24.31%)  (Table V).  
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Table V 
Factor analysis results: supplier delivery performance 
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Supplier delivery  is reliable .78   
Supplier delivers complete orders as required .72   
Supplier delivery speed is good .74   
Supplier delivers as per the specifications. .73   
We do not doubt the quality of outsourced services  .75  
The outsourced services are free from defects  .74  
Supplier has been consistent  .73  
Supplier delivers as many times as required   .72  
Supplier makes fine deliveries without faults   .73 
Supplier charges fair prices compared to others   .78 
Supplier is flexible   .72 
User complaints have reduced since we started using this supplier   .68 
Our outsourced providers are cooperative in problem solving   72 
Eigen Value 3.22 3.11 3.09 
Variance % 26.36 25.32 24.31 
Cumulative % 26.36 51.68 75.99 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Zero order Correlation  
All the hypotheses were supported. Table VI demonstrates significant positive relationships between governance 
mechanisms and buyer-supplier trust (r=.43**, p<.01), buyer-supplier trust and supplier delivery performance 
(r=.36**, p<.01), supporting H1 and H2 respectively.  Governance mechanisms and supplier opportunism were 
significantly and negatively associated (r=-.26**, p<.01) while supplier opportunism was also significantly and 
negatively related to the supplier delivery performance (r=-.54**, p<.01), supporting H3 and H4 respectively. As 
expected supplier opportunism was also significantly and negatively related to buyer-supplier trust (r=-.34**, 
p<.01) while governance mechanisms positively and significantly associated with supplier delivery performance 
(r=.0.42**, p<.01) (Table VI).  
Table VI 
 Zero Order Correlations 
 Mean SD  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Governance mechanisms-(1) 3.88 0.14 1.00    
Buyer-supplier trust-(2)  3.97 0.16 0.43** 1.00   
Supplier opportunism-(3) 4.23 0.07 -0.26** -.34** 1.00  
Supplier delivery performance-(4) 3.89 0.09 0.42** .36** -.54** 1.00 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
4.2. Hierarchical regression analysis results 
Consistent with Table VI, results in Table VII show the variation explained by the predictor variables 
(governance mechanisms, buyer-supplier trust and supplier opportunism) in the dependent variable (supplier 
delivery performance). Hierarchical regression approach was used to point out the contribution of each predictor 
in the regression model (Field, 2006). This enabled theoretical assumptions to be tested so as to examine the 
influence of each antecedent in a sequential way, such that the relative importance of a predictor is judged on the 
basis of how much it adds to the prediction of a criterion variable (Kamukama, 2013). All these antecedents 
explain 40.5%of the observed variance in supplier delivery performance (R Square = 0.405).  
In model 1 only governance mechanisms was first entered and accounted for 17.5% of the variation in 
supplier delivery performance (R square = 0.175, R square change = .175, F- change = 58.833).  In model 2 
buyer-supplier trust was added and accounted for 4.7% of the total variation in supplier delivery performance (R 
square = 0.22, R square change=.047, F-change=16.59).  Results further indicate that both mechanisms and 
buyer-supplier trust are significant predictors explaining 22.1% of the variance in supplier delivery performance 
(R square =0.221).   
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Table VII 
Hierarchical Regression results 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Governance Mechanisms-(GM) 0.441** 0.347** 0.282** 
Buyer-supplier trust-(BST)  0.329** 0.209** 
Supplier opportunism-(SOB)   -0.258** 
Constant 2.322** 1.457** 2.787** 
Sample n 279 279 279 
R .418 .470 .637 
R2 0.175 0.221 0.405 
Adj R2 .172 0.216 0.399 
R square change .175 .047 .184 
F Change 58.833 16.590 85.393 
Note: Supplier delivery performance is the dependent variable, N=632  **Significant at 1% 
 
Model 3 shows that when supplier opportunism was added in addition to mechanisms and buyer-supplier trust, 
they all significantly predicted supplier delivery performance. The results further reveal that supplier 
opportunism accounts for 18.4% of supplier delivery performance (R square = 0.405, R square change=.184, F-
change=85.393). Among the independent variables, supplier opportunism was a better predictor of supplier 
delivery performance (R square change=.184) than governance mechanisms (R square change = .175, Sig. = .000) 
and buyer-supplier trust (R square = .047, Sig. = .000) and the regression model was significant (P <.01).  
 
4.3 Testing for mediation effects 
Consistent with Baron and Kenny’s (1986) four conditions for existence of mediation effects were tested and 
results are summarized in Table VIII and IX.  
First, the mediation effect of buyer-supplier trust between governance mechanisms and supplier 
delivery performance was tested. Table VIII indicates that all the four conditions for mediation effects are met 
according to Baron and Kenny (1986).  
First, there is an effect to be mediated (β=0.619, p<0.01). Second, there is a significant relationship 
between governance mechanisms and mediator (buyer-supplier trust) (β=0.612, p< 0.01), and third, the 
coefficient of the mediator (i.e. buyer-supplier trust) is significant in regression model three (β=0.444, p<0.01) 
with both governance mechanisms and mediator (buyer-supplier trust) as predictors. Similarly, the total effect of 
governance mechanisms on supplier delivery performance is less in regression three (standardized Beta 
coefficient= 0.333, p>0.01) than in regression model two (standardized Beta coefficient =0.727, p>0.01). Hence 
providing support for H5, that, buyer-supplier trust significantly mediates the relationship between   governance 
mechanisms and supplier delivery performance. Since the coefficient of the predictor is other than zero, then 
these findings indicate that partial mediation exists in this relationship. 
 
Table VIII 
Mediating effect of buyer-supplier trust on the relationship between governance mechanisms and supplier 
delivery performance 
  Dependent variable 
 Buyer-Supplier Trust Supplier Delivery Peroformance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictor B SE Beta B SE Beta B SE Beta 
          
Intercept 1.489 .151  1.401 .201  1.032 .163  
Governance Mechanisms .612** .039 .655 .619** .052 .727 .283** 0.54 .333 
Buyer-Supplier Trust       .444** .048 .587 
          
Note: N=632, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Further, the mediation effect of supplier opportunism between governance mechanisms and supplier 
delivery performance was also tested. Table IX shows that all the four conditions for existence of mediation 
effects are also met according to Baron and Kenny (1986) testing procedures of mediation.   
First and foremost, there is an effect to be mediated (β=0.674, p<0.01). Secondly, there is a significant 
relationship between governance mechanisms and mediator (supplier opportunism) (β=-0.610, p< 0.01), and 
third, the coefficient of the mediator (i.e. supplier opportunism) is significant in regression model three 
(β=0.569, p<0.01) with both governance mechanisms and mediator (supplier opportunism) as predictors. 
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Similarly, the absolute effect of governance mechanisms supplier delivery performance is less in regression three 
(standardized Beta coefficient= 0.347, p>0.01) than in regression model two (standardized Beta coefficient 
=0.737, p>0.01). Hence providing support for H6, that, supplier opportunism significantly mediates the 
relationship between   governance mechanisms and supplier delivery performance. Since the coefficient of the 
predictor is also not zero, then these findings also indicate that partial mediation exists in this relationship. 
 
Table IX 
 Mediating effect of supplier opportunism on the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
supplier delivery performance 
  Dependent variable 
 Supplier Opportunism Supplier Delivery Perofmance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictor B SE Beta B SE Beta B SE Beta 
          
Intercept 1.489 .151  1.276 .207  .376 .186  
Governance mechanisms -.610** .039 .810 .674** .055 .735 .318** .057 .347 
Supplier opportunism       .569** .061 .582 
          
Note: N= N=632, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
4.4. Support for Hypotheses: Using 632 observations provided by Uganda’s public sector staff to validate the 
model, the survey data supported all the 6 hypotheses, as shown in Table X. 
 
TABLE X 
 SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis SUPPORT  
 H1: There is a significant positive relationship between well designed governance mechanisms 
and buyer-supplier trust. 
YES 
H2: There is a positive relationship between buyer–supplier trust and supplier delivery 
performance at the organizational level. 
YES 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between well designed governance mechanisms 
and supplier opportunism 
YES 
H4: There is a negative relationship between supplier opportunism and supplier delivery 
performance. 
YES 
H5: Buyer-supplier-trust significantly mediates the relationship between governance mechanisms 
and supplier delivery performance.  
YES 
H6: Supplier opportunism significantly mediates the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and supplier delivery performance. 
YES 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Results provide empirical support that governance mechanisms impact supplier delivery performance 
intermediated by trust and supplier opportunism. Governance mechanisms positively and significantly impact 
buyer-supplier trust. This suggests that well specified contracts promote the expectation that the other party will 
behave co-operatively which is very critical for buyer-supplier trust. Similarly, the findings indicate that 
governance mechanisms help to ensure that early, more vulnerable stages of outsourcing are successful. Equally, 
long term provisions promote the longevity of the contract by reducing the impact of unexpected disturbances. 
The complex contracting involved in outsourcing requires parties to mutually determine and commit to processes 
for dealing with unexpected changes, penalties, for non-compliance as well as other joint expectations of the 
exchange which help to gradually build trust.  
The findings also indicate that governance mechanisms negatively and significantly impact supplier 
opportunism. This finding suggests that governance mechanisms not only have the advantage of building buyer-
supplier trust because of their formal specification of long-term commitment to exchange but  thorough well-
articulated clauses that specify punishments can also limit supplier opportunism. This also implies that failure to 
contractually specify obvious clauses in outsourcing that can easily be specified lowers expectations for co-
operation and amplifies motivations for short-run cheating. Thus, the rigorous process of contracting in response 
to exchange hazards positively affects future transactions through development of social relations which build 
buyer-supplier trust and hinder supplier opportunism. These findings are consistent with Poppo and Zenger 
(2002), Goo et al. (2009) and Stefanie et al. (2010). 
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Buyer supplier-trust was found to be positively influence supplier delivery performance. This shows 
that when there is buyer-supplier trust in outsourcing, suppliers are more likely to deliver as expected. The 
finding also suggests that through effective buyer supplier-trust, supplier delivery performance is likely to 
improve due to cooperation and commitment, information sharing and reduced negotiations and conflict. This is 
consistent with Koh et al. (2009) who found that buyer supplier-trust has multiple impacts on supplier 
performance transactions between organizations in form of cooperation, commitment, information sharing and 
reduced conflict. This finding also mirrors Chiles and McMackin’s (1996) study which established that buyer-
supplier trust reduces transaction costs and increases information sharing. This finding also reflects other 
previous research findings (e.g., Hoyt and Huq, 2000; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Zaheer et al., 1998a; Johnston et al., 
2004).  
The results further indicate that supplier opportunism is negatively associated with supplier delivery 
performance. This implies that perceived threat of supplier opportunism is a major source of increased costs. 
Buyers are faced with a greater need for screening, negotiating, and monitoring partners’ behaviour, which 
results in increased transaction costs. This finding mirrors Ntayi et al.’s (2010b) study that found opportunistic 
behaviour negatively affected supplier performance due to a supplier’s lack of commitment to a given contract’s 
terms, and as a result, the value contributed by the supplier to the buyer’s is poor.  
These findings also echo Wathne and Heide’s (2000) research that found supplier opportunistic 
behaviour had a significant and negative impact on supplier performance. The results further indicate that 
governance mechanisms have a positive and significant effect on supplier delivery performance. This means that 
well specified outsourcing contracts ultimately lead to better supplier delivery performance and vice versa. This 
finding mirrors Hoyt and Huq’s (2000) research that established that governance mechanisms improve supplier 
performance.  
Buyer-supplier trust and supplier opportunism were found to have significant mediating effects between 
governance mechanisms and supplier delivery performance. This suggests that governance mechanisms improve 
supplier delivery performance through buyer-supplier trust, whereas supplier opportunism appears to diminish 
the positive relationship between governance mechanisms and supplier delivery performance. For the mediating 
effect results of buyer-supplier indicate that well-crafted contracts promote longevity in exchanges by increasing 
the penalties for a party that may prematurely dissolve an exchange relationship, and if supported by trust 
between buyers’ and sellers, the level of supplier delivery performance is likely to be higher.  
This finding possibly indicate that the process of developing a comprehensive and complex contract 
itself requires parties to engage in joint problem solving and both parties have to work as a team to develop and 
negotiate the various provisions that are incorporated in the SLA, including difficult aspects of the contract such 
as acceptable service levels, penalties for noncompliance and future contract changes. These joint efforts also 
lead to the development of social relationships and trust between the two parties, which helps the suppliers to 
meet the established governance mechanisms, thereby improving supplier delivery performance.  
These findings resonate well with studies by Poppo and Zenger (2002), Goo et al. (2009) and Stefanie 
et al. (2010) who empirically found that contract mechanisms and relational governance are both needed to 
improve supplier delivery performance. However, on the other hand, the presence of supplier opportunism 
negatively reduces the positive relationship between buyer-supplier trust and supplier delivery performance.  
 
6.0. IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1. Implications for practice 
This study provides interesting findings which have implications for both practice and theory. For practice there 
is a need for all stakeholders involved in outsourcing in public sector procurement to strongly fight supplier 
opportunism. Those involved in procurement like procurement officers, evaluation committees, accounting 
offices and contract committees should focus increased attention on strengthening supplier evaluation procedures 
so as to proactively avoid opportunistic suppliers. Further, public entities also need to deliberately develop 
mechanisms to deal with suppliers who engage in opportunistic behavior. This research found that buyer-
supplier trust was positively related to supplier delivery performance. It is quite necessary that these entities 
develop trusting relationships with reputable firms that over time have been outsourced and shown to be good 
performers. However, buyer-supplier trust takes time to emerge from fair transactions and cannot be forced. 
Unfortunately, the PPDA Act (2003) does not favor the growth of long term relationships which are a 
prerequisite for trust.  
The law emphasizes competitive tendering procedures encouraging short term relationships, clearly, 
changes to current legislation as it stands, is needed if longer term more trust-based relationships between buyers 
and suppliers are to be developed. Governance need to be complemented with buyer-supplier trust rather than 
emphasizing on either alone. For the meantime, public entities in Uganda must clearly specify contracts and 
strengthen the relationships that they have with their suppliers. Otherwise, significant improvements in supplier 
delivery performance for outsourcing in Uganda’s public sector will remain a nightmare.      
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Additionally, buyers should observe fair conduct in relation to agreements that are in force. When 
suppliers feel they are not getting what they ultimately deserve or were promised, opportunistic behavior seems 
to escalate thus negatively affecting the buyer’s organization. Entities should ensure that they clearly specify 
required products with their respective anticipated market prices as required and once delivered as needed buyers 
should make prompt payments to suppliers in a timely fashion as outlined by the terms of the contract.  In doing 
so, outsourced suppliers will not only have a better understanding of what they need to deliver, but with payment 
assured, they should also be more motivated to do so in a more effective and efficient manner.  
The PPDA Authority should educate suppliers about the dangers of opportunistic behavior and its 
negative impact on supplier delivery performance. During these sessions, suppliers should be encouraged to 
refrain from this type of behavior and be made to clearly understand that engaging in opportunistic behavior can 
significantly and negatively impact their future business prospects with the PPDA Authority. Adamant 
opportunistic suppliers should be suspended from being awarded any future contracts for some time or banned 
completely from participating in public procurement. 
 
6.2. Implications for theory 
 The study makes an important contribution by developing and testing a framework to explain the governance 
mechanisms impact supplier delivery performance intermediated by trust and supplier opportunism in Uganda’s 
public sector as a case from a developing world context. This is a significant contribution because scholars have 
largely not examined contracts both in theoretical and empirical analysis despite contracts being an essential 
component of any public procurement transactions in terms of pricing, service levels and quality requirements in 
a contractual relationship. Similarly, although many classical studies are reported in different domains involving 
these constructs in the so called developed world; existing empirical studies that focus on how they are linked 
together from a less developed country context are very scarse.  The study is a stepping stone to studies that seek 
to understand public procurement governance mechanisms which serve to align interests of contracting parties, 
increase information sharing, gradually develop trust, and reduce the potential of supplier opportunism. This has 
a great potential to improve the current literature on understanding of supplier delivery performance and the 
broad logistics performance and supply chain management. 
 
6.3. Limitations and future research 
Although this study presents interesting empirical findings, there are latent limitations worth noting. First, the 
data collection instrument that was used by this study was a standard questionnaire which limits the information 
beyond the questions contained within the survey instrument. Future research should use a qualitative case-based 
approach that uses in-depth interviews to solicit unstructured views about supplier opportunism. Secondly, this 
study adopted a cross sectional research design approach which cannot assess the behaviors of the variables over 
time. Nonetheless the purpose of this study was to establish correlations, not causality (although correlation is 
necessary for linear causation in the absence of any third and countervailing causative variable and can indicate 
possible causes or areas for further investigation; in other words, correlation gives a hint). 
Future research could employ a larger sample involving different types of public procurement 
stakeholders like the regulators, evaluation committees, remote districts, beneficiaries and more tax payers. 
Future studies should involve suppliers that provide outsourced goods and services. It would be interesting to 
compare and contrast viewpoints of both buyers and suppliers and in doing so, may provide insights into the 
basis for the phenomenon examined by this research that is otherwise unavailable at this time. While corruption 
can also provide an interesting explanation of how the current problems manifest on the ground with corruption 
appearing to be a contributing factor to the current poor supplier delivery performance, it was not possible to 
investigate it in this study and remains a difficult area to study due to the political influence involved in Uganda. 
Future studies could examine the impact of corruption on supplier delivery performance. Future studies should 
also try to obtain measurements of the independent and dependent variables from different sources and at 
different times to overcome potential threat of common methods bias. Lastly, this study uses regression analysis 
which has many weaknesses. These weaknesses especially issues of endogenity and multicollinearity will be 
fully examined in the next stage using structural equation modelling but as per now this study remains purely 
exploratory and hopefully it acts as a stepping stone to future confirmatory studies. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
Based on the findings and the foregoing discussion, the study establishes that governance mechanisms impact 
supplier delivery performance intermediated by trust and supplier opportunism for outsourcing contracts in 
Uganda’s public sector procurement. Of all the predictors of supplier delivery performance, supplier 
opportunistic behavior has the highest predicting power and therefore is more important in influencing supplier 
delivery performance. Altogether, the predictors (governance mechanisms, buyer-supplier trust and supplier 
opportunistic behavior) account for 41.6% of the total variance in the depend variable (supplier delivery 
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performance). Fundamentally, well specified formal contracts together with effective buyer-supplier trust have 
been found to be the engine of supplier delivery performance as depicted by exploratory factor analysis and 
hierarchical regression results. Therefore, for outsourcing in public sector context, the design of well specified 
contracts, development of buyer-supplier trust and mitigating supplier opportunistic behavior are the significant 
factors for successful supplier delivery performance. However, this study is exploratory and can potentially be 
used as a stepping stone in the future for more research. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahimbisibwe, A., and Muhwezi, M. (2012), “The Effects of Vertical Collaborations and Buyer-Supplier 
Compliance on Contract Performance in Uganda’s Public Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs): 
The Case of National Water and the Sewerage Corporation Uganda”, Operations Research for 
Southern and Eastern Africa Journal, Vol. 2, No.1, pp. 21-53.  
Ahimbisibwe, A. and Nangoli, S. (2012), “Project Communication, Individual Commitment, Social Networks 
and Perceived Project Performance”, Journal of African Business, Vol. 13, No.2, pp. 101-114. 
Anderson, E. (1988), “Transaction Costs as Determinants of Opportunism in Integrated and Independent Sales 
Forces”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 247-264. 
Ang, S., and Straub, D.W. (1998), “Production and Transaction Economics and IS Outsourcing: A Study of the 
US Banking Industry”, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 22, No 4, pp. 535-552.  
Artz, K.W., and  Brush, T. H. (2000), “Asset Specificity, Uncertainty and Relational Norms: An Examination of 
Coordination Costs in Collaborative Strategic Alliances”, Journal of Economic Behaviour & 
Organization, Vol. 41, No.4, pp. 337-62.  
Background to the Budget 2012/13 Fiscal Year, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
Kampala, Uganda. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.budget.go.ug/budget/sites/default/files/National%20Budget%20docs/Background%20to%2
0the%20Budget%202012-13_0.pdf 
Basheka, B. C. (2009), “Public Procurement Corruption and its Implications on Effective Service Delivery in 
Uganda: An Empirical Study”, International Journal of Procurement Management, Vol. 2, No.2, pp. 
415-440.  
Brown, T.L., and Potoski, M. (2003), “Managing Contract Performance: A Transaction Costs Approach”, 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 22, No.2, pp.275–297. 
Chiles, H.T., and McMackin, J.F. (1996), “Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and Transaction Cost 
Economics”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 73-99.  
Commonwealth (2013), Gender, Trade and Public Procurement Policy, Commonwealth Secretariat, London. 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/newsitems/documents/Gender,%20Trade%20and%20P
ublic%20Procurement%20Policy.pdf 
Corbitt, B. J., Thanasankit, T., and Yi, H. (2003), “The Relationship between Buyer and a B2B E-Market Place: 
Cooperation Determinants in an Electronic Market Place Context”, Electronic Commerce Research 
and Applications, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 203-215. 
Dillman, D. A. (1991), “The Design and Administration of Mail Surveys. Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 17, 
pp.  225-248.  
Dyer, J.H., and Chu, W. (2003), “The Role of Trustworthiness in Reducing Transaction Costs and Increasing 
Information Sharing: Empirical Evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea”, Organization 
Science, Vol. 14, No.1, pp. 57-68.  
Field, A. (2006), Discovering Statistics using SPSS (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Gottschalk, P., and Solli-Saether, H. (2005), “Critical Success Factors from IT Outsourcing Theories: An 
Empirical Study”, Industrial Management & Data Systems, Vol. 105, No. 6, pp. 685-702.  
Grover, V., Teng, T.C., and Cheon, M.J. (1998), “Towards a Theoretically-Based Contingency Model of 
Information Systems Outsourcing”, In Willcocks, L.P. and Lacity, M.C. (Eds.), ‘Strategic Sourcing of 
Information Systems: Perspectives and Practices’ (pp. 79-101). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.  
Goo, J., Kishore., R., Rao, H.R., and Nam, K. (2009), “The Role of Service Level Agreements in Relational 
Management of Information Technology Outsourcing: An Empirical Study”, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 33, 
No.1, pp. 119-145.  
Gulati, R., and Nickerson, J.A. (2008), “Inter-organizational Trust, Governance Choice and Exchange 
Performance”, Organizational Science, Vol.  19, No. 2, pp. 1-21.  
Hancox, M., and Hackney, R. (2000), “IT Outsourcing: Frameworks for Conceptualizing Practice and 
Perception”, Information Systems Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp.  217-237.  
Hoyt, J., & Huq, F. (2000), From Arm’s Length to Collaborative Relationships in the Supply Chain: An 
Evolutionary Process”, International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.24, 2015 
 
110 
30, No.9, pp. 750-764.  
Johnston, D. A., McCutcheon, D. M., Stuart, I., and Kerwood, H. (2004), “Effects of Supplier Trust on 
Performance of Cooperative Supplier Relationships”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 22, 
pp.23-38. 
Kamukama, N. (2013), “Intellectual Capital: Firms’ Hidden Source of Service Quality in the Microfinance 
Industry in Uganda”, Journal of African Business, Vol. 14, No.3, pp. 150-161. 
Kearns, G.S., and Sabherwal. R. (2007), “Antecedents and Consequences of Information Systems Planning 
Integration”, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 628-643.  
Koh, T. K., Fichman, M., and Kraut, R. (2009), “Trust across Borders: Buyer-Supplier Trust in Global B2B E-
commerce”, Paper 120: 1-38. Tepper School of Business. [Online]. Available at 
http://repository.cmu.edu/tepper/120.  
Krejcie, P., and Morgan, D. W. (1970), “Determining Sample Size for Research Activities”, Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 607–610. 
Lambe, C.J., Spekman, R.E., and Hunt, S.D. (2002), “Alliance Competence, Resources, and Alliance Success: 
Conceptualization, Measurement and Initial Test”, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 
30, No. 2, pp. 141-158.  
Luo, Y. (2002). “Contract, Cooperation and Performance in International Joint Ventures”, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 23, No.10, pp. 903-19.  
Mayer., R. C., Davis., J. H., and Schoorman, F. D. (1995), “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust”, 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No.3, pp. 709-734.  
Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, S. D. (1994), “The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing”, Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 20-38.  
National Integrity Survey (2008), Inspectorate of Government Final Report”, Kampala, Uganda: Inspectorate of 
Government. [Online]. Available at: http://www.igg.go.ug/static/files/publications/third-national-
integrity-survey-report.pdf.  
Ntayi, M.J., Namugenyi, I., and Eyaa, S. (2010a), “Supplier Delivery Performance in Ugandan Public 
Procurement Contracts”, Journal of Public Procurement, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.  479-511.  
Ntayi, M.J., Rooks, G., Eyaa, S., and Qian, C. (2010b), “Perceived Project Value, Opportunistic Behavior, 
Interorganizational Cooperation and Contractor Performance”, Journal of African Business, Vol. 11, 
No.1, pp. 124 - 141.  
Ntayi, M.J., Eyaa, S., and Ngoma, M. (2010c), “Moral Disengagement and Social Construction of Procurement 
Officer’s Deviant Behaviors”, Journal of Management Practice and Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 95-110. 
Ntayi, M.J., Byabashaija, W., Eyaa, S., Ngoma, M., and Muliira, A. (2010d), “Social Cohesion, Groupthink and 
Ethical Behaviour of Public Procurement Officers”, Journal of Public Procurement, Vol. 10, No.1, pp. 
68-92.  
Organizations for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), (2013). OECD Secretariat, Paris, France. 
[Online]. Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/ 
Office of the Inspectorate of Government Uganda (2009),  Report on the Alleged Irregular Procurement of Tetra 
Communication Walkie Talkies System for the Common Wealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM), Kampala, Uganda: Auditor General. [Online]. Available at: 
www.igg.go.ug/static/files/publications/CHOGM_TALKIE.pdf. 
Office of the Inspectorate of Government Uganda (2010), Report to Parliament: January –June 2010, Kampala, 
Uganda: Inspectorate of Government. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.igg.go.ug/static/files/publications/ig-annual-report-2010.pdf.  
Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (2010), The Report of the Public Accounts on the Report of the 
Auditor General on the Special Audit on the Common Wealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) 2007, 11th May 2010. Kampala, Uganda: Parliament of Uganda.  
Podsakoff, P. M., Mackenzie, S. B., Lee, J., and Podsakoff, N. P. (2003), “Common Methods Biases in 
Behavioural Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended Remedies”, Journal of 
Applied Psychology, Vol.  88, No. 5, pp. 879-903. 
Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (2002), “Do Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or 
Complements?”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, No. 8, pp.  707-725.  
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets (PPDA) Act (2003). [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.kituochakatiba.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=876&Itemid=
36  
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets (PPDA) Authority (2008), Final Report –The 2nd Public 
Procurement Integrity Survey. Kampala, Uganda: PPDA. [Online]. Available at:  
http://unpcdc.org/media/142845/ppda%20%202nd%20integrity%20survey.pdf  
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (2009), PPDA Annual Report 2009-2010. Kampala, 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.24, 2015 
 
111 
Uganda: PPDA. [Online]. Available at: http://www.ppda.go.ug/ 
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (2009), PPDA Annual Report 2010-2011. Kampala, 
Uganda: PPDA. [Online]. Available at: http://www.ppda.go.ug/index.php/reports/corporate-
reports.html 
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (2012), PPDA Annual Report 2011- 
2012. Kampala, Uganda: PPDA. [Online]. Available at: http://www.ppda.go.ug/ 
Schiele, J. J., and McCue, C.P. (2006), Professional Service Acquisition in Public Sector Procurement: A 
Conceptual Model of Meaningful Involvement”, International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 300–325. 
Stefanie, L., Phillip, Y., Kim, W., and Helmut, K. (2010), “Relational Governance Mediates the Effect of Formal 
Contracts on BPO Performance”, A Research Paper Presented at the 18th European Conference on 
Information Systems (ECIS), June 8th-9th, Pretoria, South Africa. [Online]. Available at 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=ecis2010. 
Special Audit of the Auditor General of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting-CHOGM Report 
(2010), Kampala, Uganda: Auditor General. [Online]. Available 
at:https://www.google.co.nz/#q=Special+Audit+of+the+Auditor+General+of+the+Commonwealth+H
eads+of+Government+Meeting- 
Wathne, K.H., and Heide, J.B. (2000), “Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms,  Outcomes and 
Solutions”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 64, No.4, pp. 36-51.  
Williamson, O.E. (1979), “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual  Relations”, The 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No.2, pp. 233-61.  
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2013), Government Procurement.  WTO. Geneva, Switzerland. [Online]. 
Available at:: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gproc_e.htm 
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., and Perrone, V. (1998a), “Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of 
Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance”, Organization Science, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp.  
141-159.  
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., and Perrone, V. (1998b), “The Strategic Value of Buyer-Supplier Relationships”, 
International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, Module 4, pp.  20-26. 
 
 
 
 
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event management.  
The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the following 
page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those 
inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version of the journals is also 
available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
Academic conference: http://www.iiste.org/conference/upcoming-conferences-call-for-paper/  
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek 
EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
